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“For the Mutual Benefit of Members
Thereof”: Attacking Capper-Volstead
Immunity and Challenging Dairy
Cooperative Power
Eduardo Castro†
Kyle Kurt was a dairy farmer for eighteen years. 1 He owned
a small herd of Holstein dairy cows, which he milked twice a day,
365 days a year. 2 But with changes in the economy, farming was
no longer possible as a way of life, and he was forced to auction off
his herd, his milking equipment, his tractors, and his other farm
supplies. 3 “It’s pretty tough waking up every morning, going to the
barn, and not being able to pay your bills, especially when you’re
putting in that many hours,” he said. “Something’s got to change or
the small farms are going to be gone.” 4
Kyle’s story is, sadly, not unique. Across rural America, smalland medium-sized farms are disappearing. 5 While there are many
†. Eduardo Castro, J.D. University of Minnesota Law School, 2020; B.A.
Bowdoin College, 2014. The author wishes to thank Professor Prentiss Cox and
Sammi Nachtigal for their feedback to make this the best work possible. He is also
grateful for all the contributions and edits made by the entire Law and Inequality
staff. This article would not have been possible without the continuous love and
support of his friends and family. Finally, he would like to especially thank all of the
people like his grandpa, who rose before the sun to make sure we had milk at
breakfast, and for their perseverance in the face of crisis in the dairy industry.
1. Rick Barrett, As Dairy Crisis Crushes Farmers, Wisconsin’s Rural Identity in
Jeopardy, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 13, 2018, 10:38 AM), https://www.jsonline.
com/story/money/2018/04/13/dairy-crisis-crushes-farmers-wisconsins-rural-identityjeopardy/511881002/ [https://perma.cc/T2UJ-9X8A].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (quoting dairy farmer Kyle Kurt).
5. See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: DAIRY
CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION (Oct. 2014), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publication
s/Highlights/2014/Dairy_Cattle_and_Milk_Production_Highlights.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/7SDM-X5JT] [hereinafter 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE]. Measuring the size
of farms is an inexact science. In the dairy industry, relevant measures include cow
herd headcounts and profits from sales. For the purposes of this Note, small- and
medium-sized dairy farms are farms making less than $1 million in sales, or farms
that have fewer than 1,000 cows. James M. MacDonald, Robert A. Hoppe & Doris
Newton, Three Decades of Consolidation in U.S. Agriculture, ECON. RESEARCH SERV.,
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 2018, at 1, 8 (Econ. Info. Bulletin No. 189), https://ww
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factors contributing to this decline, one factor is undeniable: the
increasing consolidation of agriculture is making it harder for
small- and medium-sized farmers to remain viable. Nowhere is this
trend more manifest than in the dairy industry. 6
Antitrust law should be a check against such consolidation and
rising inequality. 7 However, because the structure of the dairy
industry is largely carried out through cooperatives, the industry as
a whole has escaped scrutiny under the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act. This lack of attention is due to the Capper-Volstead
Act. 8 Passed in 1922, the Act granted immunity from antitrust
scrutiny for farmers that organized together to bargain, process,
and market their agricultural products in cooperatives. 9 The
Capper-Volstead Act was seen as offering farmers countervailing
power to organize against purchasers and processors and allowing
them to distribute and market their products more efficiently. 10 But
since 1922, cooperatives have grown into massive organizations,
with a handful of cooperatives wielding outsized control in the dairy
markets. 11 Despite no longer needing elevated negotiating power,
these cooperatives remain protected from antitrust scrutiny under
the Capper-Volstead Act.

w.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/88057/eib-189.pdf?v=43172 [https://perma.cc/2
9A9-9R4K].
6. See DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41224, CONSOLIDATION
AND CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY 11 (2010); David A. Domina & C.
Robert Taylor, The Debilitating Effects of Concentration Markets Affecting
Agriculture, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61 (2010) (concluding that concentration exists in
all major agriculture markets and calling for corrective action); See also Rick Barrett,
‘Struggling to Tread Water’: Dairy Farmers Are Caught in an Economic System with
No Winning Formula, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 16, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.jsonline.com/in-depth/news/special-reports/dairy-crisis/2019/05/16/wisc
onsin-dairy-farms-closing-milk-prices-drop-economics-get-tough/3508060002/ [http
s://perma.cc/9Y59-UW8W] (attributing other factors as contributing to the decline of
the dairy industry: a global surplus of milk, a trade war, and volatile milk prices)
[hereinafter Barrett, Struggling to Tread Water].
7. See generally Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710
(2017) (arguing that the increasing inequality in our market demands revival and
reform in antitrust jurisprudence and policy); Robinson Meyer, How to Fight Amazon
(Before You Turn 29), ATLANTIC (2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ar
chive/2018/07/lina-khan-antitrust/561743/ [https://perma.cc/N9SQ-XZVH] (detailing
the ever-growing school of thought on how the outsized powers of monopolies are
contributing to growing inequality in the current economy).
8. Capper-Volstead Act §§ 1–2, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–92 (2018).
9. Id.
10. Christine A. Varney, The Capper-Volstead Act, Agricultural Cooperatives,
and Antitrust Immunity, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2010, at 1, 2.
11. SHIELDS, supra note 6, at 11.
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Yet, the Capper-Volstead Act does not provide complete
immunity for agricultural cooperatives. While Capper-Volstead
litigation has focused on whether the structure or conduct of the
cooperative falls within the purview of the granted immunity, until
recently, litigants have often overlooked a small provision in the
language of the Act. Section 1 of the Act states that for a cooperative
to receive immunity, it must be “operated for the mutual benefit of
the members thereof . . . .” 12 As cooperatives have accrued more
control of the dairy industry, and smaller farmers have seen their
own power diminish, this language provides a powerful tool for
litigants to pierce the veil of Capper-Volstead protection.
This Note unfolds in two parts. Part I offers an overview of
inequality in rural America and the challenges posed by a changing
dairy industry and cooperative structures to small- and mediumsized dairy farmers. Next, this section provides background on the
Capper-Volstead Act, its foundational jurisprudence, and, as a case
study, the harmful practices of the largest dairy cooperative in the
United States, the Dairy Farmers of America. Part II considers the
types of arguments litigants can make to overcome Capper-Volstead
immunity. By exploring arguments already made by plaintiffs in
litigation against Dairy Farmers of America, and offering new ones,
Part II explains three ways potential plaintiffs can show that
cooperatives have not operated for the “mutual benefit of the
members . . . .” These methods are (1) arguing that a cooperative’s
coercive actions have been a detriment to its members, (2) arguing
that poor governance and management has impeded the
cooperative from operating for the benefit of its members, and (3)
demonstrating financial losses due to the cooperative’s actions.
Pursuing litigation and attacking this language specifically offers
litigants several advantages for addressing structural inequality in
the dairy industry. Ultimately, this Note argues that the “mutual
benefit” language of the Capper-Volstead Act can be a new sword to
combat the cooperatives that are unfairly using their power to hurt
small and medium farmers, and therefore, should be exposed to
antitrust liability.

12. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2018) (emphasis added).
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Part I. Background
A. Rural Inequality and the Dairy Industry
Rural America encompasses striking levels of inequality. 13
The rural population has declined steadily since 2010, a trend that
has only recently begun to reverse. 14 Despite the halt in the
population decrease, 42% of rural counties still witnessed decreased
net migration between 2012 and 2017. 15 Rural Americans are also
more likely to experience poverty when compared to their urban
counterparts, and the urban-poverty gap actually increased
between 2013 and 2017. 16 Most troubling, nearly one in four rural
children are poor, and 61% of all rural counties experience high
child poverty rates. 17
Increasing inequality in rural America has coincided with the
decline of agriculture. In February of 2018, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture predicted that net farming income would reach its
lowest level since 2002, with the median farm income projected to
be negative $1,316. 18 This decline has reverberated harshly in the
dairy industry; 2018 was the fourth straight year dairy prices were
below the cost of production. 19 In 2018, a gallon of milk cost a farmer

13. The 2016 election catapulted rural America into the public consciousnesses.
See, e.g., Chad Shearer, The Small Town-Big City Split that Elected Donald Trump,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2
016/11/11/the-small-town-big-city-split-that-elected-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc
/GC98-Q6HH] (“The results suggest that metropolitan America is feeling somewhat
optimistic about its social and economic direction, while small town/rural America is
increasingly anxious about its future.”); J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF
A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS (2016) (recounting one man’s life growing up in
rural Appalachia and shining a light on the plight of rural America).
14. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULLETIN NO. 200,
RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE, 1–2 (2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/90556/eib-200.pdf?v=5899.2 [https://perma.cc/4PHE-FKAV].
15. Id. at 2.
16. “The rural poverty rate was 16.4[%] in 2017, compared with 12.9[%] for urban
areas.” Id. at 5. While Whites make up the majority of those living in poverty in rural
America, poverty rates still remain higher among racial and ethnic minority groups
in these areas, especially for Black Americans and Native Americans. Id.
17. Tracey Farrigan, Child Poverty Heavily Concentrated in Rural Mississippi,
Even More So Than Before the Great Recession, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC. (July 2, 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2018/july/childpoverty-heavily-concentrated-in-rural-mississippi-even-more-so-than-before-thegreat-recession/ [https://perma.cc/W7Q4-44SH].
18. Siena Chrisman, Is the Second Farm Crisis Upon Us?, CIVIL EATS (Sept. 10,
2018), https://civileats.com/2018/09/10/is-the-second-farm-crisis-upon-us/ [https://pe
rma.cc/SM76-AFDJ].
19. Id.
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approximately $1.90 to produce, but farmers only received a sales
price of $1.35 per gallon. 20 Larger farming operations and
cooperatives can bear the brunt of these price declines, but these
fluctuations make farming for people like Kyle Kurt unsustainable.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture reported in January of 2018
that the total number of dairy farms in the United States had
dropped 3% in the last year alone, and approximately 17,000 dairy
farms have closed in the last decade. 21 Even in places like
Wisconsin, where dairy is the lifeblood of many local economies, the
state lost upwards of 700 dairy farms—almost two a day—in 2018. 22
As it has become increasingly harder for small and medium
farms to remain viable in the industry, there has been an alarming
spike in the rate of suicides among farmers. Studies have found that
farmers experience suicide at rates well above other occupations. 23
Farm advocacy groups are now offering stress management
seminars for farmers. 24 Because this epidemic has become so
severe, it has even prompted rare, bipartisan responses at the
federal level. 25
A cause of this growing inequality has been the increasing
consolidation of the dairy industry across the supply chain. Between
1987 and 2012, the inventory midpoint for the number of cows on a

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Barrett, Struggling to Tread Water, supra note 6.
23. Wendy Jeannette Wehrman Ringgenberg, Trends and Characteristics of
Occupational Suicide and Homicide in Farmers and Agriculture Workers, 1992–2010
(May 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Iowa) (on file with the University
of Iowa Library system); see also Nora G. Hertel, ‘Depression Is Part of Your Life’:
Farmers Get Real on Stress, Mental Health in Minnesota, ST. CLOUD TIMES (Dec. 14,
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sctimes.com/story/news/2018/12/14/farmers-stressmental-health-central-minnesota/2274945002/
[https://perma.cc/FG2Q-SLN2]
(describing how the University of Minnesota Extension program has organized
workshops aimed at curbing depression and suicide).
24. Madison Iszler, Dairy Farmers Struggle with Price Slump, Depression and
Suicide, TIMES UNION (May 13, 2018), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Da
iry-farmers-struggle-with-price-slump-12904574.php [https://perma.cc/9248-5S46].
25. See Nora G. Hertel, Emmer Bill Would Tackle Farmer Suicide, Mental
Health, ST. CLOUD TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sctimes.com/story/news/loc
al/2018/03/14/congressman-emmer-has-proposed-bill-offer-mental-health-programsmitigate-farmer-suicides-possibly-j/423513002/
[https://perma.cc/E8EU-2SF3]
(describing a U.S. House bill that would support local mental health services to
farmers and ranchers in the United States); Farmers First Legislation Boon for
Struggling Farmers, WIS. ST. FARMER (Apr. 19, 2018, 3:57 PM),
https://www.wisfarmer.com/story/news/2018/04/19/farmers-first-legislation-boonstruggling-farmers/533997002/
[https://perma.cc/6G67-A4AS]
(discussing
a
bipartisan bill in the Senate to expand mental health services for farmers).
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dairy farm grew from 80 to 900 cows. 26 In addition, from 2007 to
2012, the proportion of milk cow inventory on smaller operations
declined, while the proportion on larger operations increased. 27 In
short, smaller operations became smaller; bigger operations became
bigger. This concentration is also highly evident in the buyers’
market, which includes processors and retail stores. 28 For example,
Dean Foods, a fluid milk processor, controls about 40% of the entire
fluid milk processing market in the United States. 29 Vertical
strategic alliances are prevalent in several regional markets as
well, where processors and buyers are entering into exclusive
supply agreements with certain cooperatives. 30
Additionally, this consolidation has manifested in the
cooperative model for agricultural business broadly, and with dairy
cooperatives specifically. 31 When the Capper-Volstead Act was
passed in 1922, most cooperatives were local organizations of
farmers and of similar size. 32 Almost one hundred years later, the
size of cooperatives would be unimaginable to the drafters of the
Act. Of the one hundred largest cooperatives in the United States,
the smallest had revenues in excess of $300 million and assets
worth $43 million. 33 By the 1990s, the volume of products handled
by cooperatives had grown to $112.2 billion. 34 In 2008, the top four
cooperatives in the United States accounted for 40% of the country’s
milk production. 35 Today, the largest cooperative, Dairy Farmers of
America, Inc., (DFA) buys milk from 18,000 farmer-members and
controls almost a third of the nation’s raw milk supply. 36
26. MacDonald et al., supra note 5, at 36.
27. 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 5, at 2.
28. HIROMITSU MIYAKAWA, AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMPETITIVE ISSUES IN THE
DAIRY INDUSTRY: THE PENDING DFA/NDH/HOOD TRANSACTION 10 (2004).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Keri Jacobs, Ag Cooperatives Consolidating, Too, AG DECISION MAKER (Iowa
State Univ. Extention & Outreach) May 2017, at 3.
32. Donald M. Barnes & Christopher E. Ondeck, The Capper-Volstead Act:
Opportunity Today and Tomorrow, Paper Presented at National Council of Farmer
Cooperatives’ National Institute on Cooperative Education (Aug. 5, 1997), reprinted
in U. OF WIS. CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES, http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/capper.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180811114231/http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/capper
.html].
33. Peter C. Carstensen, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Law: Obsolete
Statutes in a Dynamic Economy, 58 S.D. L. REV. 462, 481 (2013) [hereinafter
Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes].
34. See Barnes & Ondeck, supra note 32.
35. SHIELDS, supra note 6, at 11.
36. John Burnett, Independent Farmers Feel Squeezed by Milk Cartel, NPR (Aug.
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Consolidation leaves smaller dairy farmers with little market
power. First, smaller operations are ill-equipped to endure volatile
markets for milk, making it nearly impossible for them to operate—
let alone compete—against their larger counterparts. 37 Second,
because dairy cooperatives play such an essential role in the
marketing and processing of raw fluid milk, independent farmers
and smaller dairy cooperatives are forced to accept lower prices for
milk or be frozen out of markets altogether. 38 As Nate Wilson, a
retired farmer and writer for a dairy industry newsletter stated, “coops would battle each other for market share, lowering the price to
the processor till the processor bought from somebody. It was
always to the detriment of the farmer.” 39 In places like New
England, some cooperatives have refused to purchase milk from
small dairy farms if the farmers rejected the cooperatives’
purchasing terms, leaving these farmers with no way to bring their
milk to market. 40
Cooperatives also exert their power over small dairy farms in
less subtle ways. Often, large cooperatives are vertically integrated
along the entire supply chain, made up of not just processing or
bottling plants, but also hauling operations and health code
inspectors. 41 If cooperatives are the sole providers of these essential
services, they can use access to them as leverage to prevent small
farmers from leaving the cooperative. 42 In some instances,
cooperatives have used the specter of a health code violation, or
20, 2009), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112002639 [htt
ps://perma.cc/XGF3-MBCE].
37. Jim Dickrell, Consolidation of Dairy Industry is Changing Market Dynamics,
FARM J. (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.milkbusiness.com/article/consolidation-of-dairyindustry-changing-market-dynamics [https://perma.cc/2N7P-996R]. See generally
Anna-Lisa Laca, The Death of the Mid-sized Dairy, WIS. STATE FARMER (June 14,
2018), https://www.wisfarmer.com/story/news/2018/06/14/death-mid-sized-dairy/679
979002/ [https://perma.cc/U735-24LJ] (“When it comes to surviving current market
forces, Covington says large and small [boutique style] farms will be in positions to
ride the waves, while mid-sized farms will likely be forced out of business.”).
38. MIYAKAWA, supra note 28, at 1–2.
39. Lela Nargi, What’s Behind the Crippling Dairy Crisis? Family Farmers Speak
Out, CIVIL EATS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://civileats.com/2018/11/05/whats-behind-thecrippling-dairy-crisis-family-farmers-speak-out/ [https://perma.cc/L73K-G9LH].
40. See Rebecca Carballo, Cooperative Mergers Reduce Options for Dairy
Farmers, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/story/
money/business/2017/02/17/cooperative-mergers-reduce-options-dairy-farmers/9746
1556/ [https://perma.cc/TJ2N-6Y3G].
41. See John Christensen, Dairy Farms in Crisis, Part II, CHRON.-EXPRESS (June
1, 2018), https://www.chronicle-express.com/news/20180601/dairy-farms-in-crisispart-ii [https://perma.cc/6TWJ-YQR4].
42. See id.
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have arbitrarily administered one, to suppress farmers’ milk prices
or prevent them from seeking business elsewhere. 43
Whether it be through consolidation, vertical integration, or
brass-knuckle coercion, the goal of these tactics is for the
cooperative to amass as much control as possible in a particular
market. When they do, small farmers have no other choice to bring
their milk to market and must accept the terms of the cooperative. 44
As a result, cooperatives can set prices artificially low when buying
from farmers, and extract greater profits when they sell further
down the supply chain. 45 For example, in recent litigation, it came
to light that a provision in a supply chain agreement between DFA
and a processor required DFA farmers to sell their raw milk at the
lowest price in the marketplace. 46
The growing size of these organizations raises questions of
whether cooperatives are truly accountable to their members. While
dairy cooperatives are structured to ensure that each member has
a vote in major decisions affecting the cooperative, when
membership rolls number in the thousands and span several states,
experts are worried that the interests of small farms are being
ignored. 47 Additionally, the growing size of cooperatives makes it
increasingly difficult for members to reign in self-serving
managerial actions. Unlike large corporations, which are subject to
accounting systems, information disclosure, auditing, and
regulation, cooperatives have no mechanisms to ensure
transparency or that managerial decisions are subject to
membership approval. 48 As a result, cooperatives like DFA have
frequently acquired interests in processing plants or entered into
joint ventures which have operated to the detriment of their own
members, but served as a financial boon for management and

43. See Leah Douglas, How Rural America Got Milked, NEW FOOD ECON. (Jan.
18, 2018), https://thecounter.org/how-rural-america-got-milked/ [https://perma.cc/
JPJ6-F9WJ] (“[Dairy Famer Garrett Sitts] charges that milk inspectors controlled
by his own co-op, Dairy Farmers of America, threatened him and many other farmers
with health care violations if they dared to raise questions about DFA’s business
practices.”).
44. See id.
45. See Andrew Martin, In Dairy Industry Consolidation, Lush Pay Days, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/business/in-dairyindustry-consolidation-lush-paydays.html [https://perma.cc/VQC4-6C5L].
46. See id.
47. See Carballo, supra note 40.
48. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 479–80.
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business partners. 49 Some of these ventures resulted in million
dollar payoffs for those with close ties to DFA management. 50
Typically, small farmers could turn to the Sherman and
Clayton Acts’ provisions to counter the harms of consolidation and
anticompetitive actions. In fact, empirical evidence has shown that
statutory protections from these kinds of behaviors are much more
likely to ensure that markets remain competitive. 51 However,
because of the Capper-Volstead Act, many of these cooperatives are
shielded from such scrutiny.
B. The Capper-Volstead Act
The Capper-Volstead Act was born out of the desire to protect
small farmers. In the late nineteenth century, the cooperative
model was emerging as a way for individual farmers to negotiate
against large, rapidly consolidating businesses. 52 To gain equal
footing against these large buyers and to mitigate operation costs,
farmers started to band together in the processing and marketing
of commodities. 53 However, in 1890, with the passage of the
Sherman Act, cooperatives were exposed to antitrust liability
because the law prevented farmers and businesses alike from
“combining or conspiring” together. 54 Indeed, prior to the passage of
the Capper-Volstead Act, a number of states had brought suits
against cooperatives under their respective antitrust statutes. 55 By
1922, cooperatives were thriving and prevalent in several
agricultural sectors. 56 Thus, to ensure that cooperatives were
protected from antitrust scrutiny, Congress passed the CapperVolstead Act. 57
The legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act makes clear
that Congress sought to restructure the agricultural industry to
49. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 45.
50. See id.
51. Peter C. Carstensen, Comments for the United States Departments of
Agriculture and Justice Workshops on Competition Issues in Agriculture, in LEGAL
STUDIES PAPER SERIES 2010, at 20–21 (Univ. Wis. Law Sch., Paper No. 1103, 2010).
52. Analce Heach Leach, The Almighty Railroad and the Almighty Wal-Mart:
Exploring the Continued Importance of the Capper-Volstead Act to the American
Farmer and the Agricultural Marketplace, 32 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 261, 268
(2010).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 269.
55. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 464.
56. Leach, supra note 52, at 271.
57. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 465.
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benefit farmers and consumers, with the cooperative model as the
agent of this change. 58 Senator Kellogg said in his introduction of
the bill, “[t]he main object of the cooperative association is to get
reasonable prices for the farmer, principally through lessening the
cost of marketing and selling his products and cutting down the
difference between what the farmer receives and what the public
finally pays.” 59 Legislators intended the Capper-Volstead Act to be
an important safeguard for farmers and consumers. 60 The drafters
of the Act widely viewed predatory middlemen and buyers as the
direct cause of the existing market imbalance, exploiting both
producers and consumers alike. For the 62nd Congress, the CapperVolstead Act represented a counterweight against them. 61 Lastly,
the drafters also had a clear vision of who the bill was intended to
help: small, individual farmers. 62
The Capper-Volstead Act contains only two sections, which
outline the contours of the granted immunity for cooperatives.
Section 2 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to
oversee and regulate the conduct of cooperatives if any cooperative
“monopolizes or restrains trade . . . to such an extent that the price
of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced.” 63 Section 1 of the
Act defines the mandatory structure of the cooperative in order to
receive Capper-Volstead immunity. 64 First, it limits immunity to
cooperatives only made up of “persons engaged in the production of
agricultural products, such as farmers, planters, ranchmen,
dairymen, nut or fruit growers.” 65 Second, these cooperatives may
“collectively” participate in “processing, preparing for market,
handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such
58. Id.
59. 62 CONG. REC. 2049 (1922).
60. Id.
61. 62 CONG. REC. 2059 (1922) (Statement of Sen. Capper) (“There is a wide
margin representing the rake-off of the speculative middleman.”).
62. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 830–31 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“At the time the CapperVolstead Act was enacted . . . [t]he economic model was a relatively large number of
small, individual economic farming units which actually tilled the soil and
husbanded animals . . . .”); see also 62 CONG. REC. 2257 (1922).
63. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1922). However, the Secretary of Agriculture has never used
this power. Varney, supra note 10, at 4 n.26. Additionally, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the Secretary does not have sole jurisdiction over antitrust law
enforcement in Section 2 of the Act. United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 204 (1939)
(rejecting the argument that judicial power cannot be invoked unless the Secretary
of Agriculture acts).
64. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1922).
65. Id.

2020]

Challenging Dairy Cooperative Power

155

products of persons so engaged.” 66 However, this conduct is only
allowed if, “such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of
the members thereof, as such producers . . . .” 67
Much of the litigation interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act
has focused on whether the structure of a cooperative meets the
requirements of Section 1 or whether the conduct of the cooperative
is not protected by the Act. Courts have strictly interpreted who
qualifies as a “producer” under the Act. The presence of even one
non-producer member is sufficient to destroy immunity
protection. 68 Additionally, the case law has not definitively ruled at
what point a vertically integrated cooperative would fall outside the
boundaries of the Act. Yet, Justice Brennan, in a concurring
opinion, suggested that “[a]t some point along the path of
downstream integration, the function of the [Capper-Volstead]
exemption for its intended purpose is lost . . . .” 69
The Capper-Volstead Act does not allow for cooperatives to
achieve market dominance through exclusionary or predatory acts.
Several court cases have identified behavior from cooperatives that
will exempt them from Capper-Volstead immunity. In Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, the Supreme Court
was explicit that “[the Act] does not suggest a congressional desire
to vest cooperatives with unrestricted power to restrain trade or to
achieve monopoly by preying on independent producers, processors
or dealers intent on carrying on their own businesses in their own
legitimate way.” 70 The Court ultimately ruled that activities, like
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added). The rest of Section 1 reads:
[A]nd conform to one or both of the following requirements:
First. That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote
because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein,
or,
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership
capital in excess of 8 per centum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to
an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members.
68. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967) (finding
that a cooperative was not entitled to immunity because certain members were not
actual growers but instead private packing houses); see also Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n
v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978) (holding that a cooperative of chicken growers
and processors were not entitled to Capper-Volstead protection when some members
were simply processors).
69. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n., 436 U.S. at 836 (Brennan, J., concurring).
70. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466–67
(1960).
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attempting to exclude and eliminate non-affiliated cooperatives and
producers, interfering with truck shipments, and engaging in
boycotts of particular buyers all fell outside the “‘legitimate objects’
of a cooperative.” 71 In an Eighth Circuit case, Alexander v. National
Farmers Organization, the court found that overt attempts at
boycotting independent purchasers, supply-shorting, and
purposefully delaying deliveries to independent producers by the
cooperative’s hauling operation were predatory. 72 To date, courts
have declined to articulate an exact standard to describe what may
be “exclusionary or predatory conduct.” 73 Despite the ambiguity in
the jurisprudence, courts have consistently interpreted antitrust
exemption for cooperatives strictly and narrowly. 74
Surprisingly, few courts have interpreted the meaning of the
language “operated for the mutual benefit of members
thereof . . . .” 75 The most significant discussion has come from the
Supreme Court in Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. 76
There, a producer of orange juice alleged conspiracies to restrain
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and Sunkist
countered that their actions were protected under the CapperVolstead Act. 77 The Court found Sunkist was not entitled to
immunity because, although constituting a small number of nongrower members, the makeup of the cooperative did not fall within
the “quite specific terms to producers of agricultural products.” 78
Sunkist argued that the non-producer members’ participation
ultimately helped the entire association. This argument was
rejected by the Court:
[T]he proviso in [Section] 1—“[t]hat such associations are
operated for the mutual benefit of the members
71. Id. at 468.
72. Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1187, 1195–96 (8th Cir.
1982). But see Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 715 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1983)
(upholding a cooperative’s use of its market power to boycott certain buyers unless
they changed their prices).
73. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 487.
74. Id.
75. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2018).
76. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1967). At
least one other case has discussed this language, finding that a cooperative having
ties to a state university extension program did not indicate that the cooperative was
operating to the mutual benefit of its members. Agritronics Corp. v. Nat’l Dairy Herd
Ass’n, No. 94-CV-0066, 1994 WL 542203, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1994).
77. Case-Swayne, Co., 389 U.S. at 389–90.
78. Id. at 393.
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thereof”— . . . was designed to insure [sic] that qualifying
associations be truly organized and controlled by, and for,
producers. In short, Congress was aware that even
organizations of producers could serve a purpose other than the
mutual obtaining of a fair return to their members, as
producers, . . . and the proviso adds a measure of insurance that
such organizations do not gain the Act’s benefits. 79

Even in 1968, the Court contemplated that cooperatives may not
always operate for the mutual benefit of its own members.
More recently, two antitrust cases against the dairy industry
have involved claims of Capper-Volstead immunity and the
question of whether the cooperatives at issue truly operated for the
mutual benefit of their members. 80 Both cases involved DFA. In the
first case, In re Southeastern Milk, a group of independent farmers
and DFA cooperative members brought suit against DFA, Dean
Foods, and National Dairy Holdings (NDH) for conspiring to
depress prices and engaging in anticompetitive behavior. 81
Allegedly, Dean Foods and NDH, the two largest milk bottlers in
the United States, entered into long-term, full-supply agreements
with DFA in the Southeastern region of the country. 82 In doing so,
DFA gained access to 77% of the fluid Grade A milk bottling
capacity in the Southeast, and due to regulatory requirements, all
DFA members and independent dairy farmers in the region were
required to dedicate a certain amount of their raw milk supply for
bottling. 83 To exert even more control over the market, DFA
established the Southern Marketing Agency (SMA), a marketing
and hauling cooperative, and forced independent farmers to join the
cooperative in order to gain access to the bottling plants. 84
79. Id. at 393–94 (emphasis added) (quoting Capper-Volstead Act, § 1, 7 U.S.C.
§ 291 (2018)).
80. Other recent antitrust litigation in the dairy industry has also examined
whether herd retirements of cooperative members constitutes conduct falling outside
the protections of the Capper-Volstead Act. While the plaintiffs alleged that each
cooperative at issue had not operated for the “mutual benefit of its members thereof,”
herd retirement was a residual issue in the litigation, which eventually settled. See
Class Action Complaint ¶ 100, Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. 4:11-cv4766, 2011 WL 4802918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2011). But cf. Alison Peck, The Cost of
Cutting Agricultural Output: Interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act, 80 MO. L. REV.
451 (2015) (arguing that actions to reduce supply in order to enhance prices are
protected conduct under the Capper-Volstead Act).
81. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2008 WL 2368212, at *1
(E.D. Tenn. June 6, 2008).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *2.
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Additionally, SMA required the DFA members to pay excessive fees
and dues through its hauling operations. 85 Once Dean, DFA, and
NDH had gained control of vast amounts of the market, they began
pooling and flooding substantial quantities of Grade A milk
produced outside the Southeast into the market with the intent of
depressing prices. 86
In Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., a similar scheme
was alleged, this time in the Northeast. 87 There, DFA attempted to
assume control of the market by “tying up access to milk bottling
plants in the Northeastern United States through unlawful
exclusive supply agreements,” and then coerced independent
members to join its own marketing agency. 88 DFA then fixed
“artificially low levels” for fluid raw milk prices compared to what
farmers would have otherwise received in a competitive
marketplace. 89 Moreover, the Allen plaintiffs described in vivid
detail the ways that DFA and its marketing cooperative, Dairy
Marketing Services, coerced independent farmers to join the
cooperative and retaliated against its own members if they sought
to leave the cooperative. 90 These actions included threatening to
find dubious health code violations on members, imposing
exorbitant charges on cooperatives or farmers, and entering into
“unwritten agreement[s]” to not accept the business of farmers in
other cooperatives. 91
The plaintiffs in Southeastern Milk and Allen have since
settled their class action suits. 92 Interestingly, the plaintiffs in both
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 331 (D. Vt. 2010).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand
¶¶ 157, 161–72, Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., No. 5:09-cv-00230-cr, 2011 WL
1523763 (D. Vt. Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Revised Consolidated Amended Class
Action Complaint, Allen].
91. Id. Many of these allegations may be borne out soon in litigation. A group of
the Allen plaintiffs eventually opted out of a settlement agreement with DFA. In
October of 2019, a district judge in Vermont denied DFA’s motion for summary
judgment, allowing these plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims to go to trial. Specifically,
the judge held a jury could find DFA acquired monopoly power in a “predatory
fashion,” exempting DFA from Capper-Volstead immunity. Sitts v. Dairy Farmers of
Am., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-287, 2019 WL 4739533, at *34 (D. Vt. Sept. 27, 2019).
92. See Danyll W. Foix, Litigating Capper-Volstead Cases: Developments and
Insights from Recent Decisions, 4 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. AGRIC. & FOOD COMM. EBULL. 6–10 (2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ant
itrust_law/at800006_newsletter_2013spring.authcheckdam.pdf
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cases alleged that the actions taken by DFA, both in their coercive
acts and attempts to depress the price of milk, precluded the
possibility of the cooperative operating for the mutual benefit of its
members. 93 But because both cases settled, the courts have not
ruled on the question of when and how a cooperative may not
operate for the mutual benefit of its members.
Part II: Analysis
The language in Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act
requiring that cooperatives be “operated for the mutual benefit of
the members thereof” to receive immunity provides fertile ground
to attack claimed antitrust immunity for powerful cooperatives and
address the harmful cooperative practices that hurt small and
medium dairy farms. This Section presents arguments articulated
by the plaintiffs in Allen and Southeastern Milk, as well as new
ones. Specifically, potential plaintiffs can, and should, attack
claimed immunity of cooperatives on three grounds: demonstrating
that a cooperative has taken coercive actions against its own
members, that the governance and management of the cooperative
has not represented the interest of its members, or that the
cooperative’s actions have resulted in financial losses to its
members. Furthermore, pursuing litigation against cooperatives
and undermining claimed immunity on these grounds is an
advantageous and effective way to address the structural inequality
that exists in the dairy industry.
A. Coercive Acts
One method plaintiffs can use to demonstrate that a
cooperative is not “operated for the mutual benefit” of its members
is by arguing that certain coercive acts taken by the cooperative
against its members are per se violations. As discussed in Allen and
Southeastern Milk, DFA engaged in a number of coercive practices
aimed at its own members. Some of these included unspoken

[https://perma.cc/BQQ3-MNVV]. A group of the class members in Allen have since
decided to continue the suit against DFA. See Sitts, 2019 WL 4739533 at *1.
93. See Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra
note 90, ¶ 269; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Southern Marketing Agency’s
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, at 7–8,
Scott Dairy Farm, Inc. v. Dean Foods Co., No. 2:07CV00208 58, 2007 WL 4920044
(E.D. Tenn. Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Southern
Marketing Agency’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, In re Se. Litig.]. Scott Dairy Farm is
a case in the Southeastern Milk multidistrict litigation.
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agreements among competing cooperatives to deny business to nonmembers, retaliation against its own members for considering to
leave, and the imposition of excessive fees and costs on hauling
operations. 94 In arguing these actions per se destroy CapperVolstead immunity, plaintiffs can point to the case law defining
“predatory conduct” from Section 2 of the Act to inform a court’s
interpretation of the mutual benefit language in Section 1. 95
The “predatory conduct” cases illustrate how coercive
behaviors against other cooperatives is contradictory to the CapperVolstead Act, and that this behavior is not for the mutual benefit of
its members. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers stands for the
proposition that actions taken by cooperatives to exclude or
eliminate producers or cooperative associations through boycotts
are not Capper-Volstead protected behavior. 96 This behavior is
similar to the “unwritten agreements” into which the DFA entered
with other cooperatives to ensure that its members could not find
business elsewhere. 97 Additionally, both Maryland & Virginia Milk
Producers and Alexander castigated the ways the cooperative used
hauling operations to exert pressure on independent producers and
cooperatives as unlawful. 98 In the cases of Allen and Southeastern
Milk, hauling operations and excessive costs on producers were
precisely the ways that DFA retaliated against its own members.
And, more broadly, it was the vertical nature of DFA’s operation
itself that ensured compliance from its own members. Just like the
cooperatives in Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers and Alexander
used their vertical structure in a predatory fashion, the manner in
which DFA used its vast vertical structure to leave farmers with no
other avenues to bring their raw milk to market can be analogized
to the existing Section 2 jurisprudence.
Potential defendants will likely counter that this case law can
only be limited to actions taken by cooperatives against other
94. Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note 90, ¶¶ 3, 157, 161–72;
Corrected Consolidated Amended Complaint at ¶ 3, In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig.,
No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2008 WL 5190885 (E.D. Tenn. June 6, 2008).
95. A common rule of statutory construction is that “[j]ust as a single word
cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute.” Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 (1993). Indeed, the mutual benefit language must be
informed by the Capper-Volstead Act in its entirety.
96. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 468 (1960).
97. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note
90, ¶¶ 3, 161–72.
98. Md. & Va. Milk Producers, 362 U.S. at 469; Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org.,
687 F.2d 1173, 1187, 1195–96 (8th Cir. 1982).
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cooperatives. But as Justice Black stated in his opinion in Maryland
& Virginia Milk Producers, the Capper-Volstead Act does not allow
cooperatives “unrestricted power to restrain trade or to achieve
monopoly . . . .” 99 While these cases examine the behavior of
cooperatives taken against other cooperatives, the same actions
taken by DFA are aimed to compel the subservience of its members
to the cooperative. This behavior restrains trade by preventing
members from possibly seeking better prices in a different
cooperative and maintains DFA’s market dominance. These actions
thrusted exacting costs upon cooperative members in the name of
preserving the cooperative’s market power. Applying the holdings
and reasoning from Section 2 “predatory conduct” cases to actions
taken by cooperatives against their own members is one avenue to
challenge Capper-Volstead immunity.
B. Governance Arguments
Potential plaintiffs should also argue that when the
management of the cooperative comes at the detriment of individual
members, the cooperative has not acted for the mutual benefit of
members and should lose Capper-Volstead immunity. As mentioned
above, the governance structure of large cooperatives has resulted
in little transparency and accountability for poor managerial
decisions. 100 Such problematic structures have allowed managers to
exploit markets, enter into business deals that have questionable
benefits for producers, and allocate the profits of these exploits to
themselves and their business partners. 101 These kinds of practices
do not mutually benefit members of the cooperative, and can be
challenged to show that cooperatives are not entitled to CapperVolstead immunity.
When considering potential antitrust litigation against a
cooperative, there are several aspects of the cooperative’s
governance structure plaintiffs should scrutinize to see if
management decisions or business ventures are truly being made
in the members’ interest. First, potential plaintiffs should examine
exactly who is benefiting from the cooperative’s business ventures.
As was illustrated in Allen, it appeared that a close associate of the
CEO of DFA earned $100 million for his stake in milk plants, but
the partner had paid only $6.9 million for the plants two years
99. Md. & Va. Milk Producers, 362 U.S. at 467.
100. See supra Part I; Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 479–80.
101. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 481.
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earlier. 102 Often, these kinds of ventures exploit the investment,
equity, and debt of the cooperative’s members. 103 If management
cannot justify these kinds of deals, then cooperative management is
not operating for the mutual benefit of its members and cannot be
entitled to antitrust immunity.
Plaintiffs should also examine deals by cooperatives that
significantly expand their interest in processing plants. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture does not require that any profits made
from joint ventures or processing operations go to producer
members of cooperatives. 104 Especially when cooperatives enter
contracts with processors to offer raw fluid milk from producers at
the lowest price in the markets, entering such lopsided ventures is
clearly a detriment to producer members. 105
When cooperatives enter into joint ventures with processors
for interest in processing plants, management inherently enters
into a conflict of interest. While the cooperative’s goal is to obtain
the highest price for its members’ milk, a processor’s interest is to
obtain the lowest price possible from the producer. 106 Given that
management is not required to share any profits gained in
processing, management has great incentive to align its interest
with the processors, rather than the individual members. Indeed,
DFA’s income from processing comprised 60% of its net income in
2016, which was not shared with farmer members. 107 If this occurs,
plaintiffs should argue that taking these kinds of significant
interests in processing plants will ensure the cooperative does not
operate for the members’ mutual benefit.
102. Compare Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen,
supra note 90, ¶¶ 74, 124 (discussing the $100 million payment of the promissory
note, though other financial information is redacted), with Martin, supra note 45
(suggesting, through context, although redacted, the same amount of money).
103. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note
90, ¶ 184.
104. Id. ¶ 189.
105. Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 331 (D. Vt. 2010).
106. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note
90, ¶ 62.
107. Leah Douglas, Farmer’s Case Against Giant Dairy Co-Op Will Go to Trial,
MEREDITH AGRIMEDIA: SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.agricult
ure.com/news/business/farmers-case-against-giant-dairy-co-op-will-go-to-trial
[https://perma.cc/DG4G-827J]. Recently, Dean Foods, the largest milk processor in
the United States, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. They have since announced they
are in negotiations with DFA to have the cooperative buy the entire company. Jordan
Valinsky, America’s Largest Milk Producer Files for Bankruptcy, CNN BUS. (Nov. 12,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/12/business/dean-foods-bankruptcy/index.html
[https://perma.cc/NM3R-UCKJ].
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Moreover, this argument is bolstered by Justice Brennan’s
concern in National Broiler. In his concurrence, he noted that at a
certain point of vertical integration by the cooperative, it no longer
meets its intended purpose under the Capper-Volstead Act. 108
Brennan’s concurrence went to great lengths to discuss the possible
ramifications of allowing processors, whose sole function is
processing, to be granted Capper-Volstead immunity. In his
opinion, this would lead the “behemoths of agribusiness” to accrue
unfettered power and the “exploitation and extinction” of farmers
at the hands of “men who control the avenues and agencies” that
bring milk to market. 109 The DFA litigation makes abundantly clear
that Brennan’s concerns were realized: that vertically integrating
milk processing and hauling operations led to the “exploitation and
extinction” of farmers at the hands of the cooperatives. This kind of
integration, therefore, should exempt these cooperatives from
Capper-Volstead immunity. 110
As noted earlier, cooperatives—even large cooperatives such
as DFA—are not required to perform any kind of financial
disclosure, nor are their managerial decisions subject to member
approval. This lack of requirement or approval makes accessing
cooperative business documents difficult. In some cases,
cooperatives have been outright hostile to allowing members access
to these documents. 111 While the applicable litigation procedure
seems like a hurdle to making governance arguments against
Capper-Volstead immunity, it offers the potential for plaintiffs to
obtain these documents in discovery. Courts have affirmed that
Capper-Volstead immunity is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry,
and thus, if pleadings are sufficient, cannot be adjudicated on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) grounds. 112 Therefore, if
plaintiffs reach discovery, these documents can be accessed.

108. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 834–36 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 834–35 (quoting 62 CONG. REC. 2058 (1922)).
110. But see David P. Clairborne, The Perils of the Capper-Volstead Act and Its
Judicial Treatment, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263 (2002) (arguing that the CapperVolstead Act would permit vertically integrated processors to be immune from
antitrust scrutiny).
111. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note
90, ¶ 190.
112. Foix, supra note 92, at 8.
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C. Showing Pecuniary Losses
Finally, plaintiffs can show that both coercive actions and
governance problems that result in financial losses to members
illustrate that the cooperative is not being operated for the
members’ mutual benefit. Prime examples are the actions taken by
DFA in the Allen and Southeastern Milk cases. In both cases, the
plaintiffs alleged that supply agreements that DFA entered into
with milk bottling processors ultimately resulted in depressed
prices for raw milk. 113 The plaintiffs intended to present expert
witnesses illustrating the actual financial losses experienced by
members from the actions. 114 To explain hauling contracts or effects
from consolidation, plaintiffs can admit expert testimony to
illustrate how they suffered financial losses because of these
actions, and therefore, defendants are not acting for the mutual
benefit of the cooperative’s members. Finally, following the DFA
merger in Allen, where the cooperative took out a significant
interest in a number of processing plants, the plaintiffs had
demonstrated exactly how this deal hurt their members’ financial
interest. Over the alleged antitrust period, the plaintiffs
demonstrated that the price for raw fluid milk declined, while
processors’ margins saw gains over the same period. 115
D. Mutual Benefit Language and Litigation as a Preferred
Strategy to Address Inequality in the Dairy Industry
Using mutual benefit language to litigate antitrust claims
against cooperatives is advantageous for several reasons. First,
given the dearth of case law interpreting the language, it provides
space for creative arguments and allows litigants to mold claims to
address truly egregious practices of cooperatives, like coercive
hauling contracts, discrimination based on the size of farmers, and
price manipulation. Second, litigants have a statutory
interpretation advantage against cooperatives, in that exemptions
from antitrust laws must be construed narrowly. 116 Finally, it is a
measured way to pursue antitrust violations against the
113. See Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra
note 90, ¶¶ 3–4, 30; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Southern Marketing Agency’s
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, In re Se. Litig., supra note 93, at *1, *7–9.
114. In re Se. Milk, No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2012 WL 1981511, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. June
1, 2012).
115. Revised Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Allen, supra note
90, ¶ 193.
116. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982).
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cooperatives. Cooperatives are an indispensable part of the dairy
industry, and more often than not, truly represent the interests of
their members. 117 Some have even proposed the use of cooperatives
as a way to combat monopoly power. 118 Challenging cooperatives
through this language can ensure that only cooperatives that truly
act against the interests of their members are denied CapperVolstead immunity.
Also, litigation as a strategy to remedy this inequality is much
more achievable than the alternative of pursuing change through
the political arena. Since the 1970s, the Department of Justice has
frequently re-examined the utility of the Capper-Volstead Act to
meet the current realities of the dairy industry. Each time, the
Capper-Volstead Act remained untouched. 119 In fact, when the U.S.
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust went so far as to say that
“an examination of whether the law is serving its intended purposes
may lead to a conclusion that it is not the right law for the state of
the industry at this time,” 120 she was met with a “tsunami” of
pushback from farmers and legislators. 121 Additionally, reform at
the local level is unlikely to seriously address the challenges posed
by large cooperatives, given that many cooperatives now span
several states. 122 The “iconic status” of the Capper-Volstead Act
among politicians and farmers alike makes policy changes
effectively untenable. 123
Some may argue that the dearth of case law interpreting the
meaning of the mutual benefit language demonstrates that this
part of the Capper-Volstead Act is inconsequential. That is simply
not the case. The structure of Section 1 of the Act makes clear that
“operat[ion] for the mutual benefit” of producers, even though not
explicitly enumerated, is a required element to receive Capper-

117. See Douglas, supra note 43 (illustrating how Westby Cooperative Creamery
has sustained the rural, local economy).
118. See Sandeep Vaheesan & Nathan Schneider, Cooperative Enterprise as an
Antimonopoly Strategy, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2019).
119. Kenneth R. O’Rourke & Andrew Frackman, The Capper-Volstead Act
Exemption and Supply Restraints in Agricultural Antitrust Actions, COMPETITION:
J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SECTION ST. B. CAL., Fall 2010, at 69, 71–
72.
120. Id.
121. Carstensen, Obsolete Statutes, supra note 33, at 496.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 462–63.
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Volstead protection. 124 The legislative history of the Act and its
subsequent jurisprudence reinforce this notion.
The legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act shows that
it was intended to protect small, individual producers from greedy
“middlemen.” One express concern during the bill’s debate was that
individual farmers were prone to financial exploitation, and
therefore, organizing in this manner would improve their market
position. 125 The mutual benefit language ensured that individual
producers would truly reap the benefits of the cooperative, not
suffer at its hands. Indeed, the legislative history demonstrates that
some current-day cooperative management would almost certainly
draw the ire of the Capper-Volstead Act’s drafters. One Senator
stated during the bill’s deliberations that “a policy cannot always
exist under which those who toil must toil at a loss and contribute
to those who neither toil nor spin, but sit in their palaces at
mahogany desks and draw in the rake-off in the shape of a
middleman’s profit.” 126 During the time of the allegations against
DFA, its CEO made $31.6 million during his seven-year tenure. 127
Moreover, the case law has paid special attention to the
original intent of the Act to protect small farmers. In National
Broiler, Justice Brennan stated “[i]t was the disparity of power
between the units at the respective levels of production that spurred
this congressional action.” 128 As Justice Marshall laid out in his
majority opinion in Case-Swayne, the statute was crafted with
small dairy farmers in mind: “qualifying associations [should] be
truly organized and controlled by, and for, producers.” 129 The Court
realized that the drafters were well-aware that cooperatives could
potentially operate for interests other than “the mutual obtaining
of a fair return to their members . . . .” 130 While perhaps the drafters
did not contemplate that the management of cooperatives would
generate upwards of $31.6 million in salaries and pursue deals
largely to enrich management and shareholders, 131 the purpose of
the Act is unequivocal. The Act was meant to help protect the model
124. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2018).
125. Clairborne, supra note 110, at 286.
126. 62 CONG. REC. 2261 (1922) (statement of Sen. Norris).
127. Martin, supra note 45.
128. Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 830–31 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
129. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 386, 394 (1967).
130. Id.
131. See Martin, supra note 45.
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of “small, individual, economic farming units,” and the mutual
benefit language embodies that sentiment. 132 Thus, the language is
an indispensable provision of the Act and can be the basis for
valuable litigation.
Litigating under this clause, however, is not without
challenges. Namely, if some members of a cooperative want to
pursue litigation against the entity, but others do not, the
proposition that the cooperative has not operated for the mutual
benefit of its members could be undermined. Justice Harlan raised
a similar concern in Case-Swayne, where he expressed concern that
imposing the harsh punishments of antitrust violations against
cooperatives would ultimately burden the individual members
themselves. 133
These concerns can be addressed procedurally. Both
Southeastern Milk and Allen ultimately certified classes against the
defendants. In Allen, the court simply certified two subclasses of
DFA class members: those who believed that DFA was subject to
antitrust scrutiny and members with “divergent interests.” 134 And
while some class members may disagree with the claims, the court
in Southeastern Milk appeared to be open to still finding the
cooperative had not operated for members’ mutual benefits. 135 The
plaintiffs during the class certification phase proffered witness
testimony that the cooperatives ultimately affected all members. 136
The court held “[i]f plaintiffs can prove at trial that all members of
the DFA subclass have been equally harmed by illegal acts
committed by the defendants, the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are
met.” 137
Conclusion
The mutual benefit language of the Capper-Volstead Act offers
potential grounds to challenge antitrust immunity claimed by
cooperatives. Rural America is facing unprecedented levels of
inequality. As small and medium dairy farms are disappearing, so
is the profound sense of identity and the lifeblood of many rural
132. See Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n, 436 U.S. at 830–31.
133. See Case-Swayne Co., 389 U.S. at 397 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
134. Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., No. 5:09-cv-230, 2012 WL 5844871, at
*6–7 (D. Vt. Nov. 19, 2012).
135. In re Se. Milk Litig., No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2012 WL 1981511, at *3 (E.D. Tenn.
June 1, 2012).
136. Id.
137. Id.

168

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38: 2

communities. Increasing consolidation and the outsized power of
large cooperatives are in part to blame. One way to combat this
trend is through increased antitrust action and challenging claimed
immunity under the Capper-Volstead Act. For this immunity to be
granted, cooperatives must demonstrate that they operate for the
mutual benefit of members. Plaintiffs should utilize this overlooked
language to pierce the veil of immunity. They can do so by
challenging coercive actions taken by cooperatives against their
members, scrutinizing misguided governance decisions, and
demonstrating financial losses caused by cooperative actions.
Pursuing litigation with this language poses several advantages for
litigants, as well. Ultimately, this language can be a tool to protect
those who depend on their modest herds and humble plots to make
a living and ensure that a vanishing way of life is not lost forever.

